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Abstract 
An ongoing challenge for central banks is represented by communication policy paradox, which involves the effectiveness of 
monetary policy strategies in pursuing financial stability. The communication paradox captures the idea that an increasing level 
of communication and transparency of central banks, along with more efficient economic policies will lead to a higher level of 
financial stability. The paper aims to outline the communication policy significant implication on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, starting with a qualitative approach and continuing with an empirical analysis based on the example of four central banks, 
namely BOJ, ECB, FED and NBR. 
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1. Introduction 
Amid deepening economic and financial turmoil, which started in the summer of 2007 in the U.S. real estate 
market, through major disruptions in the financial markets and real economy, central banks have acted to restore the 
“health” of the financial system, giving priority to financial stability objective.  
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A key aspect in the adoption and implementation of monetary policy decisions was and still is communication 
policy. A notable change in central banks strategy in the recent years has been the movement towards a progressive 
communication of monetary policy decisions, of the main objectives that central banks pursue and also their 
projection regarding future developments in the economy, by these enhancing central banks actions.  
Central banks, although they used to be really reserved, they communicate much more about monetary policy 
issues, especially because of the pressures from the recent financial crisis. 
The paper is structured in five parts and it begins with a short incursion in the theme and its importance. The 
second part reviews some concepts regarding communication policy and the binomial monetary policy-financial 
stability. In the third part it was highlighted the role of central banks in ensuring financial stability in the current 
global crisis, including and comparative analysis and also an empirical one. The fourth part surprises some lessons 
draw from the current crisis and the challenges that revolve around the financial system.   
The study ends with a summary conclusion. 
2. Literature review 
In the previous period, central banks used to be very reserved in the information disclosure, being accused of a 
lack of clarity and transparency, the communication policy being linked to phrases such as “esoteric art”, “secret of 
the temple”, “monetary mystic” or “constructive ambiguity”, being elevated as a desire the following reasoning: the 
effectiveness of monetary policy is directly proportional to the monetary policy shocks (the information is provided 
by surprising market actors) (Brunner, 1981). 
Over time, it has been noticed a process of transformation, which can be based on the fact that if the monetary 
authorities are more open to general public, there could be registered an increasing level of monetary policy 
effectiveness, so the actions provide a link between long-term and short-term interest rates. In this regard, an 
increase of the predictability of central banks actions can lead to a more effective management of monetary policy, 
or the economy as a whole. For example, in the vision of the economist Woodford, the success of monetary policy is 
not guaranteed just by controlling short-term interest rates, but also by influencing market expectations in the 
desired direction (Woodford, 2005).  
Also, after acquiring central bank independence by removing political interference factor, it was induced also the 
increasing level of accountability of monetary authorities, which involved a shift towards a greater transparency of 
monetary policy. 
Currently, central banks' ability to influence the real economy depends to a significant extent on their competence 
with respect to the market expectations on the future evolution of the interest rates. A comprehensive set of current 
policies and also future ones for the general public is crucial for the effectiveness of monetary policy. In this respect, 
it is considered that monetary policy becomes gradually the art of managing expectations (Haan et al., 2009). 
Arguments in favour of a strong communication are: 
x Increasing monetary policy efficiency;  
x Increasing the predictability of central banks actions;  
x Increasing the central banks’ independence. 
Through a wide communication policy, it’s imposed an increased transparency, so the central bank will provide 
to market actors its own vision regarding the fundamental factors that guides monetary policy, leading to the 
creation of a virtuous cycle (Blinder, 2006).  More precisely, transparency allows the increase of monetary policy 
effectiveness by amplifying its credibility, by means of a growing responsibility and self-discipline and also 
improves the monetary policy anticipations on a medium term.  
Central banks’ transparency is seen as an ingredient of good practice in term of monetary policy, so it is 
considered necessary not only because enhances democratic responsibility but also because it promotes an efficient 
control of public's expectations regarding the bank (Cukierman, 2007). If we consider the arguments regarding the 
monetary authorities secret actions, in the paper Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking, we can find the 
following reasons: the braking of speculative gains, the avoidance of assuming by FOMC an unwanted previous 
engagement, the conservation of central banks’ capacity to intervene on interest rate according to the principle of 
gradualism and others (Goodfriend, 1985).  Currently, a possible justification of the secrecy maintenance concerning 
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monetary policy, is, in the opinion of Blinder, the following a central bank should keep things a secret only when 
there are compelling reasons for doing so (Blinder et al., 2008). 
As regards to the grounds for which monetary authority avoid surprising markets, some studies make reference to 
minimizing the interest rate and volatility of the exchange rate and influencing in the direction of the desired 
inflationary expectations (Filardo et al., 2008). Also, Drew and Karagedikli (2008) emphasize the strengthening of 
central banks credibility and reputation, the decrease of macroeconomic volatility regarding monetary policy 
flexibility and also the uncertainty reduction in the private sector.   
Undoubtedly, transparent communication is the most indicated in the dialog with target groups, but the academic 
literature drew the attention on an excessive communication (Trabelsi, 2012). This excess can conduct to the 
creation of confusion and a negative effect on inflationary expectations, especially in case of the states that provides 
projections of monetary policy interest rates (i.e. Norway or Sweden), thus making reference to the transparency 
triangle of the monetary policy strategy: sincerity, clarity and information efficiency (Winkler, 2000).   
In the optical of Papademos (2008), the central bank should be as transparent as possible, but not always, so the 
studies undertaken overtime suggest that a transparent communication is beneficial but it’s necessary to identify its 
limits. In this context, it’s relevant the following opinion of Blinder (2008): maybe the best thing that a central bank 
can do is to teach markets its way of thinking. 
Once the subprime crisis has been triggered, the literature has sown a keen interest on the issue of financial 
stability so this paper’s main purpose it to outline the relationship between a transparent communication policy and 
financial stability, especially in time of recession. In this respect, the literature comprises a series of papers that have 
highlighted the vital need to improve the communication policy (Ingves, 2010, Aucremanne and Ide, 2010, 
González-Páramo, 2010). 
 ( ... ) The relationship between a central bank and target groups is similar to the relationship of married couple. 
An effective communication is the key element to make the relationship face its daily obstacles. It’s a long-term 
relationship and although periodic disagreements do not jeopardize the relationship it can make it less pleasant or 
mutually beneficial (Rakesh, 2005).  
3. The role of central banks in ensuring financial stability 
3.1. Methodological approach 
The methodology captured in this paper is divided into two segments being detailed in the following. Thus, the 
paper has captured a qualitative analysis but also a quantitative one. First of all, it was used as a method, the 
comparative analysis, so there were studied four central banks, namely Bank of Japan, European Central Bank, 
Federal Reserve System and National Bank of Romania. The data used was from financial reports, statistics and also 
interactive databases of NBER and central banks. The period analysed has been prior to the international financial 
crisis and up to the most recent data identified, namely 2004-2013, with annual values, and in the case of others 
monthly. The motivation of this research is referring to the different impact of the crisis on the monetary systems 
analysed and also at the link between a transparent communication policy and financial stability. 
The second perspective of the analysis refers to the concept of financial modelling, so it was used the 
autoregression and moving average model. It should be noted that literature has been granted a considerable 
importance on the impact of monetary policy on the real economy, but also for the banking sector, and in this 
respect there are relevant a series of papers which outlined the importance of decisions precision and the 
effectiveness of monetary policy promoting a clear and transparent communication policy (Zettelmeyer, 2004, 
Bhattarai, 2003, Geraats, 2008, Ehrmann et al., 2010, Kim et al., 2011). 
Empirical analysis shall be reported to the index of transparency and the analysis focuses on a forecast for a 
certain period of time, namely 2010-2013.  
The methodological design is described in the following.
tntnttt TTTT HEEEE   ...2211 0                (1) 
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Where, T- the index of transparency and İt -random variable. 
First of all we checked if the series were integrated of the same order, regarding stationarity tests, namely 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller, Phillips-Peron and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin. Continuing we applied classical 
testing of hypotheses, respectively homoscedasticity, autocorrelation and normality. In this regard we used Durbin-
Watson, Breusch-Godfrey and Jarque-Bera test. 
3.2 Central banks’ communication policy during the global financial crisis 
 
According to the specialty literature, the role of monetary authorities in ensuring financial stability is resulting 
from central banks’ traditional function but also from the interrelation between the elaboration and implementation 
of monetary policy and financial systems’ stability. In exceptional circumstances, such as those of crisis, central 
banks have the role to act in order to eliminate panic from the financial markets, to provide the functionality of the 
credit markets and to prevent the collapse of systemic financial institutions (Nier, 2009). 
In this regard we can notice that first if all, central banks reduced monetary policy interest rates, whereas the 
impairment of financial market conditions changed the perspectives regarding financial stability. Another reason is 
the one referring to the necessity to put lending activity into recovery. Therefore, faced with significant pressures on 
the financial markets with a high potential to spread on the real economy, monetary authorities decreased gradually 
the interest rate, by this registering historical levels, around 0% (see Figure no. 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own processing after official statistics of BOJ, ECB, FED and NBR. 
Fig.1 Changes in monetary policy interest rates in the case of 4 central banks, 2004-2013 (September) ( %) 
 
Because of the background created by the international financial crisis, the monetary authorities adopted and 
implemented a series of measures which aimed at re-establishing financial stability and the functionality of the 
financial markets. In this framework, the financial stability objective seems to lie in central banks attention although 
most of the statutes provide as fundamental objective price stability (the case of ECB, NBR). From the central banks 
studied, only ECB and NBR followed restrictive monetary policy behaviour by increasing interest rate of the 
monetary policy.  
Central banks, despite their reserved behaviour from a few years ago, communicate even more about the 
monetary policy promoted, especially during the global financial crisis. Due to banks option to not communicate the 
decision adopted and to surprise the participants from the financial markets, it was noticed that the efficiency of the 
strategies was reduced due to the long period necessary to align participants’ actions to the direction imposed by the 
central bank. Under crisis conditions, the communication policy should have as objectives the need to restore the 
confidence of the financial markets participants and also the maintenance of central banks’ credibility.  
Under conditions of financial crisis, the phenomenon of information asymmetry that exists on the financial 
markets is much more developed due to financial markets volatility aspect that can affect the clarity of the 
information provided leading to a financial uncertainty. A member of the NBR, Board of Directors, captures the 
importance of communication:  words can move exchange rates, quotations and asset prices, as a reflection of the 
"vibration" (...) produced in the mind of market actors (Pop, 2008). 
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According to economic practice and speciality literature, in a period of turbulence, the message and the voice 
(individual or collective) of central banks are staying under the sign of prudence and a deliberate ambiguity.  
It’s also imminent a comparative analysis of the transparency level regarding the central banks studied. The 
overview for the last twelve years shows us an increasing tendency for Eichengreen transparency index, except for 
FED, where the value is constant for the last eleven years. Some remarkable results were noticed in the case of NBR 
which took a series of measures in order to improve the level of clarity and credibility of monetary policy (see 
Figure no. 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own processing after official statistics of National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Fig. 2 Evolution of Eichengreen transparency index within central banks studied, 1998-2009 
 
Thus, in exceptional circumstances such as the current crisis, we subscribe to the opinion according to which 
finding suitable words at the right time, with regard to monetary policy, as well as to financial stability, remains in 
the centre of central banks art and we believe that prudentiality is governing the communication policy promoted by 
monetary authorities. 
3.3 The analysis of communication policy effectiveness in times of crisis 
 
Regarding the empirical analysis, the model takes the form of autoregression and moving average, depending of 
the variable taken in the study (see table 1). The analysis continued by testing the stationarity of the data, so first of 
all the results showed us that we do not accept the null hypothesis, by this referring to the fact that the variables do 
not have a unit root. It has been found that the variables satisfy this hypothesis in case of the first order difference, 
but in some cases we preferred the logarithm. The purpose of this analysis is to produce a forecast for the next four 
years, respectively 2010-2013 (see table 2).  
 
Table 1Model estimation 
Monetary authority Type of model Indicators 
R-Squared Akaike criterion Schwarz criterion Durbin-Watson stat 
BOJ MA(5) 0,6194 -3,5152 -3,4428 -3,0608 
ECB AR(1) 0,6190 1,3499 1,4222 1,9263 
FED MA(1) 0,6525 0,6330 0,7138 0,9650 
BNR MA(5) 0,7344 -1,7847 -1,7123 1,3829 
Source:  author’s calculation 
 
Financial stability has been maintained robust in the last period, so the financial system followed the trend in 
normal parameters. However the pressures generated by an economic and financial environment dominated by 
uncertainty, were translated from the euro area to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Romanian financial 
system suffered as a result of these events via amplifying the spread of securities, through the evolution of the 
exchange rate, by slowing down the economic growth rate etc.  
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The fundamental purpose of the autoregression and moving average model was to highlight the implication of 
previous values of the indicators on the current and futures ones, by this achieving also a forecast for the next four 
years in the case of Eichengreen transparency index (see table no. 2).  
 
Table 2The transparency Index Forecast for the period 2010-2013 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 Trend 
BOJ 10,50 11,22 11,96 12,75 Ĺ 
ECB 11,06 11,11 11,15 11,18 Ĺ 
FED 10 10 10 10 constant 
BNR 7,06 7,63 8,24 8,91 Ĺ 
Source:  author’s calculation 
 
The previous evolution of this indicator for the central banks taken in the study can be viewed in figure 2. The 
results of the analysis carried out shows us an improvement relatively shy of the level of central banks transparency 
and, in the case of the Federal Reserve System the values are maintained constant, as it happened in the period 1999-
2009. 
After many years crowned by success, the international monetary systems are facing historical changes, so many 
of the previously applied mechanisms are found to be exceeded in the current economic conditions. In this regard, 
there are a series of pressures on the monetary market referring to the vital need of applying some transformations, a 
reconfiguration regarded at three level, an economic level, a business model level and last but not least the level of 
financial education.  
4. Lessons and challenges for central banks 
Among the most important lessons learned by the current crisis is that price stability is not sufficient to maintain 
financial stability and macroeconomic stability (Aucremanne and Ide, 2010). Also, monetary authorities must grant 
greater attention to long-term effects of monetary policy, whereas maintaining too much time a low level of interest 
rate encourages excessive risk-taking, with huge potential to affect financial stability (Craig, 2011). 
One of the most representative lessons of current turbulence is captured in Mishkin’s paper (2011), where it 
outlines the even more crucial role of the transparency on monetary policy effectiveness. Even under the conditions 
in which monetary policy has been confronted with limits (the value of the interest-rate monetary policy around 0 
%, beyond which cut is no longer possible), central banks have shown that monetary policy has effective tools even 
in such circumstances (Issing, 2011).  
Despite the fact that currently it’s being observed a series of tensions regarding the explicit incorporation of 
financial stability as a major objective for central banks, the crisis has shown that a single tool, namely monetary 
policy interest rate does not allow the implementation of both price and financial stability. For instance, under the 
terms of a vulnerable economic climate, which requires a low level of interest rates, central banks are already facing 
the inflationary phenomenology, which requires an increase in monetary policy interest rate. Therefore, it is 
necessary to find the proper tools, which allows both types of stability.On the other hand, taking into account the 
successful concerted action between some central banks (for example, the simultaneous action on 8 October 2008, 
when it was the strongest monetary policy reduction of interest rates with 0.5 per cent, by six major central banks it 
may come off another lesson of current international crisis which consists in assessing importance of cooperation 
between the authorities in dealing with the effects of monetary crisis, suggesting a strong impact of a transparent 
communication.  
In addition, the subprime crisis has brought to light the need of central banks orientation to the macroprudential 
size, which in turn, raised a series of concerns of institutional nature, organizational, but also linked to a suitable 
instrument: identify some suitable financial indicators, developing some early warning and more complex systems 
to address financial imbalances, developing some models for financial contagion which identifies in a better way the 
connections between the real and the financial sector, taking into account the huge dimension of existing statistical 
information. 
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Also, another lesson that should be learned from the present crisis is that of parsimony or moderation, for both 
the decision-makers of monetary policy but also for all the participants on financial markets, which out of a desire to 
accumulate fast earnings, took excessive risks, not taking into account the rational agent pattern. 
 A mighty challenge for monetary authorities, but also for the fiscal authorities, is the intensification of sovereign 
debt crisis that has been developed due to the efforts of the member states to support other economies, being a 
continuation of the subprime crisis. Regarding the monetary policy, but also financial stability, the high level of 
sovereign debt raises serious problems for competent authorities, referring especially to the future generations. 
Therefore, it should be a close cooperation between the fiscal and the monetary front, this having the capacity to 
increase financial stability and hence a good transmission of monetary policy in the financial sector and the real 
economy.  
One of the most important challenges of the current financial crisis is the one referring to central banks’ 
credibility, namely the risk of damaging central bank’s image so monetary authorities must act prudently in 
disclosing information.   
Therefore, the range of challenges for central banks is very generous in term of potential risks to price and 
financial stability, to the cost associated, to influence factors etc. 
5. Conclusions 
The above analysis reveals a close link between monetary policy and financial stability, especially in exceptional 
circumstances, such as the current international crisis. The central banks’ communication policy is a crucial aspect 
of the decision adoption and implementation process.  
In the period preceding, the central banks were very reserved institutions, being actually accused of a lack of 
clarity and transparency. Overtime, the communication policy tended towards a metamorphosis process, which can 
be justified by the fact that a greater opening of monetary authorities to the general public, could lead to an increase 
in the monetary policy efficiency since the actions provides a link between long term and the short-term interest 
rates.  
The communication represents a two-way street, involving different responsibilities. Each of the parties involved 
in the process has certain obligations and commitments, necessary to streamline the communication process.  
With regard to the econometric study, we notice that the period studied was an atypical one, marked by numerous 
challenges at an international level, so the conditions on international financial markets, such as for example the 
liquidity excess in the crisis period, led to a series of mutations in the financial plan. The results of the analysis 
carried out, shows an improvement relatively shy of the level of central banks transparency and, in the case of the 
Federal Reserve System the values are maintained constant. 
In exceptional circumstances a significant lesson that should be learned from the present crisis is that of 
parsimony or moderation, for both the decision-makers of monetary policy but also for all the participants on 
financial markets. Some mighty challenges for monetary authorities, but also for the fiscal authorities, are the 
following: intensification of sovereign debt crisis and maintaining central banks’ credibility. 
The analysis faces a series of limits through the prism that has not been taken into account the new international 
pressures, namely the deepening of the sovereign debt crisis (the case of Cyprus, Greece etc.), aspects that will 
generate a boost in financial systems risks.  
Future research directions are aiming at extending the period of study and of the variables taken in the analysis, 
in order to ensure greater accuracy of the results and to highlight the existing situation before the financial crisis. 
Currently it is intended to outline the impact of an efficient communication policy on financial stability, in this 
respect the future studies should answer to a series of issues, namely: the impact of transparent communication on 
the public and quantifying the clarity and quality of the communication process.  
References 
[1] Allard, J., Catenaro, M., Vidal J.P., Wolswijk, G., Central bank communication on fiscal policy, ECB WP 1477, September 2012,;   
[2] Aucremanne, L., S. Ide, Lessons from the crisis: Monetary policy and financial stability, 2010, Economic review,  Issue II, pp.7-20; 
644   Ioana-Iuliana Tomuleasa /  Procedia Economics and Finance  20 ( 2015 )  637 – 644 
[3] Bhattarai, K., An Analysis of Interest Rate Determination in the UK and Four Major Leading Economies, Research Memorandum no. 42, 
Business School, University of Hull, UK, 2003;  
[4] Beck, M., Hayo, B., Neuenkirch,M.,  Central Bank Communication and Correlation between Financial Markets: Canada and the United States, 
MAGKS Papers on Economics, no.201201, 2012;  
[5] Blinder, A, Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher, M., De Haan, J., Jansen, D.J., Central Bank Communication and Monetary Policy: A Survey of Theory 
and Evidence, ECB WP 0898, May 2008; 
[6] Blinder, A., Monetary Policy Today: Sixteen Questions and about Twelve Answers, Princeton University,  CEPS Working Paper No. 73, July 
2006;  
[7] Born, B., Ehrmann, M., Fratzscher M., Macroprudential policy and central bank communication, CEPR Discussion Paper No.8094, November 
2010;  
[8] Brunner, K., The Control of Monetary Aggregates, 1981, http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/conf/conf23/conf23a.pdf;  
[9] Craig, R., Sean, Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis for Monetary Policy Frameworks, SEACAN-CEMLA Conference, Malaysia, October 
2011; 
[10]Corbo, V., Financial stability in a crisis: What is the role of the central bank?, , BIS Papers No 51, 2010; 
[11]Cukierman, A., The limits of transparency, , CEPR Discussion Papers, Np.6475, September 2007;  
[12]Dale, S., Orphanides, A., Imperfect Central Bank Communication Information versus Distraction, IMF WP 08/60, March 2008;  
[13]Drew, A., Karagedikli, Ö.,  Some benefits of monetary policy transparency in New Zealand, Reserve Bank of New Zealand Discussion Paper 
Series, No. DP2008/01, February 2008 
[14]Ehrmann, M., Eijffinger, S., Fratzscher, M., The role of central bank transparency for guiding private sector forecasts, 2010, Scandinavian 
Journal of Economics, pp.1018-1052; 
[15]Filardo, A., Guinigundo, D., Transparency and Communication in Monetary Policy: A Survey of Asian Central Banks,  Research Conference 
on Transparency and Communication in Monetary Policy, Philippines, February 2008;  
[16]Geraats, M., ECB Credibility and Transparency, European Economy-Economic Papers, No.330, June 2008;  
[17]González-Páramo, J., M., Lessons from the crisis for monetary policy and financial stability Cyprus,  Annual Money, Macro and Finance 
Conference, Cyprus, September 2010; 
[18]Goodfriend, M., Monetary Mystique: Secrecy and Central Banking, Federal Reserve of Richmond Working Paper, No.85-07, 1985;  
[19]Goodhart, Charles, A., E., Osorio, Carolina, Tsomocos, Dimitrios, P., Analysis of Monetary Policy and Financial Stability: A New Paradigm, 
CESifo Working Paper Series, No.2885, 2009; 
[20]Haan, J., Jansen, D., The communication policy of the European Central Bank: An overview of the first decade,DNB Working Papers, No.212, 
June 2009; 
[21]Ingves, S., Central bank governance and financial stability, Speech at the Royal Bank of Scotland, October 2013; 
[22]Issing, O., Lessons for Monetary Policy: What Should the Consensus Be? , IMF Working Paper No.11/97, April 2011; 
[23]Kim, K., Kim, B.K., Park, H., Monetary policy framework and financial procyclicality: international evidence, Chapter in Macroprudential 
regulation and policy, Vol.60, pp.51-57, 2011;  
[24]Mishkin, F., S.,  Monetary policy strategy: Lessons from the crisis, NBER Working Papers, No.16755, February 2011; 
[25]Nier, E., W., Financial Stability Frameworks and the Role of Central Banks: Lessons from the Crisis, IMF Working Papers, No.09/70, April 
2009; 
[26]Papademos, L., Monetary policy communication and effectiveness, Speech at the Annual Meeting of the Allied Social Science Associations, 
New Orleans, January 2008;  
[27]Pop, N., Decizia de politica monetară: între teorie ܈i intui܊ie, Studii Financiare no. 3/2008, www.bnr.ro;  
[28]Rakesh, M., New economic geography and monetary policy in aflattening world, Comments at a symposium sponsored by the Federal reserve 
Bank of Kansas City, Wyoming, August 2005;  
[29]Trabelsi, E.,The relationship between central bank transparency and the quality of inflation forecasts: is it U-shaped?, EERI Research Paper 
Series No 02/2012, February 2012;  
[30]Winkler, B., Which kind of Transparency? On the Need for Clarity in Monetary Policy-Making, ECB Working Paper Series, No.0026, August 
2000; 
[31]Woodford, M., Central Bank Communication and Policy Effectiveness, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Journal Proceedings, pp.399-
474; 
[32]Zettelmeyer, The impact of monetary policy on the exchange rate: evidence from three small open economies, 2004, Journal of Monetary 
Economics, pp.635-652. 
